Given its impressive economic performance over the past two decades, Ireland earned the title, the 'Celtic Tiger'.
-the usual level for a developed economy -to 15% at the peak of the boom in 2006-2007, with another 6% coming from other construction. … Irish banks were lending 40% more in real terms to property developers alone in 2008 than they had been lending to everyone in Ireland in 2000, and 75% more to house buyers.12
The impact of the subprime crisis
The global credit crisis and the resultant tightening of global liquidity and collapse of the property market had serious ramifications for Ireland's overleveraged banking sector. Although, unlike their US counterparts, Irish banks had hardly issued complex mortgage or mortgage-related financial instruments, what they had issued generously and without much regulatory oversight were loans to property developers, who in turn invested in speculative real estate ventures. Even more shocking, two of the country's largest banks had financed much speculative real estate without asking for the requisite collateral. The banks now faced their moment of reckoning as the sharp drop in asset values depressed the balance sheets of the highly leveraged financial institutions. Put bluntly, as Ireland's real estate boom went bust, the country's banking sector now burdened with an unprecedented volume of bad loans saw their balance sheets deteriorate so rapidly that they faced simultaneously a solvency and a liquidity crisis. 13 Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and at the height of the global credit crisis, Ireland found itself confronting heightened investor panic and depositor runs, and mounting fears of a total banking collapse, not to mention, a potentially humiliating sovereign default.
In desperation, on 30 September 2008, Dublin approved a guarantee covering €400 billion (USD 530 billion) of liabilities of six of the largest Irish-owned banks, only to be further increased to €485 billion to cover foreign-owned banks with significant operations in Ireland. In addition, on 7 April 2009, the non-performing property-based loans were transferred to Ireland's 'bad bank', the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). Yet, these enticements proved inadequate to quell market concerns. Arguably, with their backs to the wall, the Irish government tried to calm the jittery markets by doing the unprecedented: guaranteeing the private sector's liabilities by providing a blanket guarantee to the deposit base of the country's entire banking sector for two years. That is, in a last-ditch attempt to restore confidence in the nation's financial system, Dublin took the bold gamble of providing an explicit guarantee to all bank deposits for two years. With that, almost instantly, Ireland's essentially private sector debt (literally worth three times Ireland's annual GDP) was transformed into public or sovereign debt. Therefore, by nationalising private debts or taking over the private losses of the banking system, Ireland saw its public debt jump from about 7 percent of GDP to over 100 percent of GDP. Worse still, as a private debt problem was converted into a sovereign debt problem, private bondholders and other lenders who had 'skin in the game' got off the hook as they were allowed to withdraw their funds, leaving the taxpayers to pick up the huge tab. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has provocatively captured this bitter irony by noting, …before the bank bust, Ireland had little public debt. But with taxpayers suddenly on the hook for gigantic bank losses, even as revenues plunged, the nation's creditworthiness was put in doubt. So Ireland tried to reassure the markets with a harsh program of spending cuts.
Step back for a minute and think about that. These debts were incurred, not to pay for public programs, but by private wheeler-dealers seeking nothing but their own profit. Yet ordinary Irish citizens are now bearing the burden of those debts.14
Dublin's response
To be fair to Dublin and appreciate its predicaments, however, one has to ask what its options were and what constraints it faced. Simply walking away from the insolvent banks -and thereby preventing a banking crisis from morphing into a sovereign debt crisis -is easier said than done.
Arguably, Dublin could have offered the holders of the senior debt of the major Irish banks more incentives (or read them the riot act for that matter) in order to reschedule or restructure their debts, even if this could have triggered a destructive sell-off in the banking sector in the eurozone, besides negatively affecting bank ratings. What the case of Ireland underscores is that if a country has a banking/financial sector that is 'systemic' or 'too big to fail', the country or the sovereign often has little choice but to defend that sector as their fates are inextricably and intimately tied.
Clearly the markets were cognizant of this. This partly explains why, contrary to expectations, the Irish government's gamble (and generosity) failed to satisfy the markets -especially the creditors (read bondholders).15 Given the massive volume of debt that Ireland was now holding, foreign creditors began to doubt Dublin's ability to meets its guarantee (that is, service its debt), and continued to flee (or more politely withdraw) their funds from the banks. By mid-2010, it was painfully clear not only that the yields and the prices of credit default swaps for Irish government bonds were still increasing, but also that investors were still dumping the bonds of several of the socalled peripheral eurozone members -namely Ireland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, countries that had run up massive debts and deficits. Despite massive infusion of capital, including the Irish government's decision to nationalise or take major equity stakes in five of the six insured banks at an estimated cost of €50 billion (USD 65 billion), Ireland's state-backed banks were still struggling to raise funds and becoming ever more dependent on the short-term loans provided by the EU. To the already nervous markets, this served to further exacerbate their fears regarding the possibility of an eventual bailout, if not outright default. 
the beleaguered Irish government to formally seek assistance, that is, accept a bailout package offered jointly by the EU and the IMF. On 28 November 2010, Dublin finally received approval of an €85 billion (USD 113 billion) emergency aid package of which some €45 billion would come from bilateral loans from the EU (in particular, the two EU rescue funds set up in spring 2010), €22.5 billion from the IMF, and €17.5 billion from its own pension reserves.
For its part, using the fund from its own pension reserves was just one of the bitter pills or 'conditionalities' Ireland had to swallow. Dublin, which in 2008 had already slashed spending and raised taxes to the tune of about €15 billion, had to agree to an austerity plan which will cut an additional €15 billion (made up of €10 billion in spending cuts and €5 billion in tax and other revenue-generating measures) over the next four years, including sharp reductions in public sector jobs, wages and benefits -and increased property taxes from the already besieged homeowners.
However, even these Draconian cuts may not be enough to meet the government's (and the EU/IMF's) target to bring Ireland's budget deficit down to about 2.8 percent of GDP from the current 12 percent by 2014. 19 What is certain is that for the residents of Ireland, the future will be defined by a massive fiscal retrenchment, which means living with painful austerity measures and hard times.20 Yet, adding insult to injury, the major banks of the other EU nations, including the UK, Germany and France, which have large exposures to the Irish economy and are the beneficiaries of the Irish's government's blanket guarantee, will hardly feel a commensurate pain. Similarly, the EU/IMF package exempted senior bondholders (although subordinated-debt holders were not spared), who lent money to Irish banks from suffering any losses -even though the EU agreed that private investors will be held accountable for losses in future crises.21 The EU did add an important caveat though to this controversial measure. Specifically, beginning in 2013, eurozone bonds will include clauses requiring bondholders to accept debt restructuring measures "on a case-by-case basis" -meaning that bondholders will be liable only if a country becomes 'insolvent' and about to default on its obligations (it is important to note that bondholders, including banks and hedge funds, were also protected in the Greek bailout).
On 15 December 2010, even as the Irish Parliament approved the EU/IMF bailout package, the opposition Fine Gael party threatened to renegotiate the agreement with the aim of forcing senior bondholders in Irish banks to take their share of losses. It should be noted that, if the threat comes to pass and Ireland unilaterally reneges on its responsibilities, the ramifications will be profoundly negative for Ireland's reputation and economy. However, even if it does not, the challenges for Ireland remain significant. Indeed, given the fact that the EU/IMF bailout package fails to strike an appropriate balance between revenue and spending measures, it is not clear how it will help Ireland reduce its public debt, estimated currently at around 130 percent of GDP.
What is clear is that in its current shape the package will add to Ireland's already high debt levels. substantial domestic fiscal cuts. This means that Ireland may no longer be able to raise funds on financial markets without paying prohibitive interest rates, raising questions about its long-term solvency. Not surprisingly, the markets know that a painful debt restructuring cannot be ruled out.
Indeed, if the real task is to reduce the high debt ratios (rather than simply throwing more money at the problem), than giving some so-called haircuts or write-downs and restructurings sooner rather than later makes more sense. Of course, this will mean some pain for the bondholders.
The average annual interest rate for the IMF/EU loans to Ireland, set at 5.8 percent, is also rather high for a struggling economy. Ireland may not be able to service its debt. Under those circumstances, the interest and principal may well take more than chum change from the country's national income. As a result, Ireland (like Greece) could very well come to the point where it will need to devalue its currency if it hopes to restore competitiveness. Of course, that is not possible as long as Ireland remains in the eurozone.23 As noted, debt restructuring is also an option, but this could precipitate a wider European banking crisis. In turn, such a crisis would negatively impact US banks and the global financial markets in general because Ireland's economy has deep financial linkages with global markets. As a recent IMF report duly states, "disorderly eruption of financial pressures in Ireland could have wider implications through foreign banks' exposure to Ireland".24
Apparently, Ireland's rescue package was deliberately announced over the weekend (on 28 November) before financial markets opened on Monday in an effort to relieve pressure on Portugal and Spain, whose creditworthiness remains in doubt. Although the bailout for Ireland seems to be large enough, that is to provide cash flows to salvage the nation's beleaguered banks and keep the Irish government solvent, it remains to be seen if the financial rescue package will restore enough confidence in the markets and thereby prevent the 16-nation eurozone from further bailouts, including default.25 If the contagion spreads to Spain, or worse, spills over into countries like Italy and Belgium, the very future of the euro will hang in the balance. After all, Ireland and Greece have modest debt levels compared to Spain -whose public debt is estimated at over €1 trillion, not to mention that Spain also has €1 trillion in private foreign liabilities. While the EU's powerhouse, Germany, has repeatedly stated that it stands behind the euro, and while the EU does have a €750 billion (USD 992 billion) temporary rescue fund that can be used either to buy 'toxic' assets or as bailout loans, it may not be enough to ward off a virulent financial contagion.
Eurozone challenges
The EU needs to instill confidence in the markets quickly before the current rolling debt crisis becomes a systemic threat to the eurozone. This will require the European Commission to present a united and comprehensive response to deal with the crisis, instead of the current country-bycountry approach. In addition, the eurozone must carry out a more meaningful review of its banking sector. In July 2010, when the EU stress-tested its banks, the results showed that only 7 of the 91 banks failed the test. Although, the markets felt that the tests were not rigorous enough, the exercise 23 As Eichengreen notes, "… the standard way to buffer the effects of austerity is to marry domestic cuts to devaluation of the currency. … But, since none of these countries has a national currency to devalue, they must substitute internal devaluation for external devaluation. They have to cut wages, pensions, and other costs in order to achieve the same gain in competitiveness needed to substitute external demand for internal demand." B. Eichengreen, "Europe's Inevitable Haircut", Project 
